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FIRST-PERSON 
AUTHORITY
Melissa Ragain
Have I Reasons: Work and Writ-
ings, 1993–2007 by Robert Morris. 
Edited and introduced by Nena 
Tsouti-Schillinger. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2008. Pp. 
273. $84.95 cloth; $23.95 paper.
It should come as no surprise to 
those familiar with the artist Robert 
Morris that the title of his new col-
lection of work and writings, Have 
I Reasons, invokes Ludwig Witt-
genstein’s Philosophical Investiga-
tions: “Have I reasons? The answer 
is: my reasons will soon give out. 
And then I shall act, without rea-
sons” (65). Wittgenstein, after all, 
was a major point of reference in 
Morris’s fi rst collection of writings, 
Continuous Project Altered Daily 
(1993), as the theorist who spoke 
most directly to Morris’s concern 
with the suppression of the linguis-
tic dimension of art by modernist 
criticism. Morris transforms the “I” 
of Wittgenstein’s interrogation into 
the declarative of the book’s title, 
implicitly offering the authority of 
fi rst-person narrative and to prom-
ise “reasons” behind the Morris oeu-
vre. Wittgenstein is joined in this 
second volume by the likes of Noam 
Chomsky and Donald Davidson; 
the latter’s linguistic philosophy is 
addressed directly by two essays, 
and his infl uence is felt in several 
others. This interest in the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of language is 
also no surprise; Morris has consis-
tently been one of the most well 
read, articulate, and intensely self-
conscious artists in the last one hun-
dred years, and as Tsouti-Schillinger 
argues in the introduction, “any 
complete analysis and assessment of 
Morris’s total artistic contribution 
would prove inadequate without 
consideration and inclusion of his 
copious writings.” What is surprising 
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is the powerful presence of the words 
of others in these pages, and not 
only from the recurring voices of 
his favorite theorists. Morris repeats 
pet quotations throughout the book 
(Elizabeth Bishop’s remark that the 
twentieth century was “the worst so 
far” appears in at least three essays) 
as well as numerous epigrams, block 
quotes, and intersectional quota-
tions. This idiosyncrasy crescendos 
in his essay for the National Gallery’s 
recent Jasper Johns retrospective, 
which carries a list of citations to 
rival any academic article.
For those in search of the artist 
himself, the opening account of 
Morris’s childhood in Kansas City, 
“Indiana Street,” seems to offer just 
the tidbits of artistic origin that typ-
ically fi ll artists’ biographies. De-
scribing the physical terrain of 
Indiana Street, for instance, Morris 
writes, “It was with secret pleasure 
that I squeezed my body between 
the pole and the side of the garages, 
making my passage usually at dusk. 
Although unnamed, and perhaps 
unnamable, such spaces, of which 
there were many around the neigh-
borhood, took on a special charac-
ter. I would usually visit each once 
a week” (22). Under the sway of such 
evocative images, what art histo-
rian can resist picturing Robert 
Morris squeezed inside of Passage-
way, the narrow semicircular chan-
nel of painted plywood he installed 
in the entrance to Yoko Ono’s loft 
in 1961? And who can help fi nding 
the many faces of Morris’s career 
prefi gured in the characters that 
populate his memory? The Morris 
who would grow up to dance with 
Yvonne Rainer and Simone Forti 
of “youthful strength and delight 
in physical grace of movements” 
(29) seems already personifi ed in 
the neighborhood ice delivery man. 
The wraithlike Turtle Bill trolls the 
streets in a cart full of rags and scrap 
iron that prefi gures Morris dressed 
in rags for his performance of War 
(1963). Morris’s late references to 
autism are presaged by the men-
tally handicapped boy, who “with 
the inertia of what the others termed 
his ‘simpleness,’ seemed to have 
dropped through the insulation of 
their linguistic repressions to move 
against some clammy, sexual mem-
brane that pulsed hidden and un-
mentioned just below the surface of 
those lives on Indiana Street” (28). 
But what binds together the myriad 
phenomenological, socioeconomic, 
political and sexual awakenings re-
lated in this opening gambit is the 
trusted voice and coherent identity 
of Morris the Author.
In the two essays that follow “In-
diana Street,” Morris uses his knowl-
edge of linguistics to refl ect on the 
role of the artist in the writing of his 
own history as well as the role of rea-
son in artistic production. Switching 
from fi rst to third person for “Writ-
ing with Davidson,” Morris agrees 
with the philosopher’s assertion 
that reasons (associated with beliefs 
and desires) are suffi cient to hold 
the status of causes. But the inclu-
sion of Davidson quotations in the 
borders of Blind Time Drawings, a 
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set of drawings made with Morris’s 
eyes closed or blindfolded, unsettles 
the notion of intentionality associ-
ated with reason, belief, rationality, 
and holism (all central to Davidson’s 
philosophy) through the voluntary 
renunciation of control and judgment 
in these chance-directed actions. 
Throughout the essays, the interplay 
of reason, artistic intention, and the 
personal pronoun further obscure 
the already ambiguous role of art-
ists’ writing in criticism and art his-
tory. Morris most directly confronts 
the issue of self-interpretation in 
“Professional Rules,” which returns 
us to the fi rst-person of the title only 
to take it away again:
In the studio I ask myself this 
question: What will happen if 
I do a and then b? After that I 
ask further, Now what hap-
pens after c and then d? Much 
later, and in the context of the 
public space of the gallery, is 
it then a misinterpretation for 
others to take the object I have 
made as fi rst a “statement,” 
about which subsequent ques-
tions are then to be asked? 
And you—that is to say, R. 
Morris; and I will adopt the 
you to address him from here 
on in—want to say that your 
questions in the making not 
only preceded the object but 
resulted in it? (63, 65)
The fi rst half of the collection is 
concerned with the fi xity that the 
object, the gallery, and the stable 
fi rst-person of the artist seem to 
lend to artistic practice. It is the latter 
that Morris frequently abdicates, 
only to restore it again and again 
in his writing, oscillating between 
adamant self-erasure and reluc-
tant authoritarianism. Such play is 
reminiscent of Morris’s 1962 I-Box, 
a plywood cabinet whose I-shaped 
door opened to reveal a photograph 
of a nude, grinning Morris, that 
suggested both the fading away of 
the artistic persona behind the pro-
noun and a further assertion of au-
thorial continuity.
This series of usurpations is played 
out not only in the frequent shifts of 
grammatical person but also in the 
quotation and scripting of others by 
Morris. This tack was central to 
Morris’s performances during the 
1960s and 1970s, most poignantly 
the performance 21.3, in which the 
artist, dressed in the stale tweed of 
academia, mouthed the words of an 
essay by Irwin Panofsky’s along to a 
recorded reading of the text. The 
transcription of Birthday Boy, a 
projection shown in the Galleria 
dell’Accademia in Florence in 2004, 
similarly blurs the distinction be-
tween artist and scholar, presenta-
tion and performance. In the work 
two actors deliver “academic” lec-
tures on Michelangelo’s David that 
begin by denying, but ultimately 
indulge in, the notion of object 
of art as an object of desire. The 
distance enforced by academic lan-
guage breaks down as the two lec-
turers are handed glass after glass of 
red wine. As these presentations are 
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revealed as acts of projection, slides 
of Krazy Kat and Mussolini make 
their way into the carousel, along 
with images of David morphed into 
the body of a black woman and a 
middle-aged man.
It is also worth noting that the 
only Morris interview included in 
the collected writings takes place 
“From the Chomskian Couch,” as 
an imagined conversation with 
Noam Chomsky, who acts as the 
analyst to Morris’s analysand. If we 
were to look at the generation that 
preceded Morris—to Jackson Pol-
lock’s stint in Jungian analysis, for 
example—we might fi nd the ana-
lyst’s couch to be the very symbol of 
the artist-subject as the great well-
spring of art. Yet the unconscious 
that Chomsky plumbs is not Mor-
ris’s but the “imperial unconscious” 
(impunc) dedicated to the suppres-
sion of the other, and a peculiar 
American rejection of pastness. The 
impunc is one in a set of newly 
coined acronyms that suggest the 
conjoining of the art world and the 
military industrial complex: the mega 
image (megig), American Phenom-
enological Awe (amphena), the 
multiscreen video installation 
(muscrivt) or the installation art of 
the spectacle (inarse). These, Mor-
ris argues, are the facets of the 
“Wagner effect,” an utterly Ameri-
can art “of looming icons of domi-
nating presence, offering a kind of 
odd forgiveness secretly addressed 
to those whose guilty lives make 
such expressions possible” (129). 
“Style,” Morris continues, “does not 
matter much for the Wagner effect, 
gigantic size and expense being the 
generating engine. Of course, be-
sides the grandiosity, touches of the 
mystical and allusions to origins 
don’t hurt either—they didn’t hurt 
Wagner” (129).
Morris links the Wagner effect 
fi rst to the shift by American muse-
ums from an institution open to the 
public, to an institution that serves 
the public, and subsequently to the 
entry of the artist into the larger ser-
vice economy that caters to popular 
taste. Initially an attempt to over-
come the contemporary environ-
ment of spectacle, Wagnerian art 
was quickly absorbed by it. Amid 
this rapid commercialization of the 
aesthetic, Morris asks the timely 
question: “What, I would like to 
know, is to be asked of the social 
body that sometimes fi nds itself in-
side a museum?” (158). Just as the 
artistic unconscious has been dis-
placed by an imperial one, we fi nd 
that the empirical-phenomenal body 
of ’60s art has been replaced by a de-
cidedly less innocent social body 
whose two-page list of resentments 
is detailed by Morris in “Solecism of 
Sight.” “Clearly the social body to-
day carries more wounds than half 
a century ago,” writes Morris, and 
with an uncharacteristic glimmer 
of faith continues, “Perhaps even 
its somewhat callow narcissisms and 
feckless optimism is beginning to 
fade, making room for the possi-
bility of a certain self-criticism that 
it never felt much need of before” 
(159).
 ON ROBERT MORRIS’S HAVE I REASONS 337
It is from this position of critical-
ity that the volume ends, closing 
with an essay that situates the paint-
ing of Jasper Johns within the con-
text of his military service, and that 
endows Johns’s work with renewed 
relevance in a new era of American 
military aggression. Readers of Mor-
ris’s second volume of writings will 
be struck by the explicitly political 
viewpoint of such essays, as well as 
by the deft handling of philosophy 
and prose that graces even Morris’s 
more polemical writing in his old 
age. From his position as resident 
art world curmudgeon Morris con-
tinues to “play out the drama of the 
shifter,” as Rosalind Krauss put it in 
her 1977 article “Notes on the In-
dex.” Morris dislodges the “I” from 
its indexical relation to an existen-
tial subject and shatters Davidson’s 
linkage of it to rationality and be-
lief. The “I” of Morris’s recent 
writing has always already escaped 
these moorings, but the impish 
wordplay of early works like I-Box 
is joined in these later writings to a 
melancholic imperative “to accept 
the darker shadows within our-
selves, and to meditate on that 
fallen world into which we have 
been cast” (253).
—University of Virginia

